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I. INTRODUCTION
The beginnings of modern copyright laws can be traced to the fifteenth
century, when state authorities, responding to the spread of the printing
press, granted printing privileges to printers for two unrelated but inevitable
reasons. On one hand, exclusive privileges to print encouraged investment
in burgeoning literary and music industries; on the other, they provided a
convenient tool for press regulation and censorship by the state.1 In both
cases, a right to print was inherently teleological in that it supported state
pursuits of identified goals and was justified by the aims of economic
growth or political stability; the law was morally justified. Literature on
copyright history further suggests that the notion of authorship, central to
modern copyright laws, developed to elevate the status of writers to authors.
Authorial status justified claims to proprietary control of literary works as
print businesses made works more accessible to a paying public and offered
writers an alternate source of income besides patronage.2 By constructing a
highly romanticized notion of the genius author and original authorship,
authors and publishers could use copyright laws to justify exclusive protec-
tion of markets and income from those markets. Theories of paternity and
* I thank the University of St. Thomas and the Terrence J. Murphy Institute for Catholic
Thought, Law, and Public Policy for organizing this timely symposium. I am also grateful to the
participants at the Intellectual Property and Religious Thought Symposium for many comments
that helped make this piece so much better and to the editors of the St. Thomas Law Journal,
especially Steven Kool, Emily Niles, and Ben Kajer, for tireless and excellent editorial work. All
errors in this article remain mine of course. As always, this piece is dedicated to my family.
1. See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
(1993) (examining the concept of authorship from its formation in eighteenth-century Britain to its
application to contemporary intellectual property issues); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) (providing analysis of copyright development from a historical,
rather than legal lens); JANE A. BERNSTEIN, PRINT CULTURE AND MUSIC IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY
VENICE (2001) (offering a socioeconomic look at the Venetian music press during the mid-six-
teenth century, thereby illustrating early issues in ownership of intellectual property).
2. See MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HIS-
TORY OF AESTHETICS 40–44, 50–55 (1994) (tracing the German development of the concept of
“author” from professional writer into someone deserving superior property rights over publishers
and illegal piracy publishers to use their writing as a way to make a living).
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just deserts supported these claims for author’s rights.3 But the protection of
the creator of an original work through copyright laws was also largely
teleological in that the justification for protecting creators of literary and
artistic works was based on the outcome of legal protection and not because
it was inherently ethical to protect the rights of individual creators.4
Decisions to protect exclusive privileges to print, distribute, and dis-
play creative works and grant proprietary control over creative works are
moral judgments that are essentially consequentialist. Protecting authors
and publishers from unauthorized uses of published works by the public
comes with an undeniable social cost—harsh restraint on public freedom to
use expressive works, build upon knowledge and increase self-awareness,
and develop a unique cultural identity. And sometimes laws that are conse-
quentialist in nature, such as copyright laws, also produce imperceptible
inequalities. As a result, many injustices are ignored as lawmakers choose
among non-commensurable values. In some respect, a moral benchmark is
necessary for these choices to be effectively evaluated and to mitigate injus-
tices and inequalities. This paper proposes that natural law theory and Cath-
olic social teaching provide an effective way to evaluate choices made by
the law and to guide decision-making towards the common good.
Despite the unmistakable social costs, copyright laws continue to pro-
tect exclusive privileges and proprietary rights of creators and publishers,
albeit temporarily, because the ultimate consequence of exclusive protec-
tion—the supply of literary and artistic works to the public—justifies any
temporary burden these exclusive monopolies may impose on society.
Thus, this “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers” is
desirable to the extent that it ensures a prolific production of literary and
artistic works for the benefit of society.5
In this respect, the Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution empow-
ering Congress to promote the progress of science through grants of exclu-
sive rights to authors is consequentialist in nature,6 and so was England’s
first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, enacted to encourage learning.7
International norms governing copyright relations multilaterally on a global
level are also inherently consequentialist. The Berne Convention’s primary
3. See ROSE, supra note 1, at 32–41 (discussing the seventeenth-century writer’s use of
paternity metaphors and reward and punishment analogies to advocate for proprietary ownership
in opposition of licensing barriers and piracy by publishers).
4. “The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution
is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that
the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted
by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.” H.R. REP. NO. 60-
2222, at 7 (1909).
5. Thomas Babington Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th
of February, 1841, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 309, 311 (Robert P. Merges &
Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2004).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
7. 8 Ann., 1710, c. 19 (Eng.).
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aims were the elimination of piracy of national works distributed abroad,
the harmonization of copyright laws to prevent authors from losing incen-
tives for creativity, and the protection of the vested interest of national pub-
lishers and printers in exclusive printing rights.8 This is despite Berne’s
express language protecting authors’ rights.9
Finding justification for copyright law in the result or consequences of
its legal rules would be sensible since result-based ethics or consequential-
ism is based on the understanding that the morally right choice in a difficult
situation is the choice that produces the most happiness and the least
amount of unhappiness for the greatest number of people. This straightfor-
ward cost-benefit analysis is simple to use. It would appeal to an individ-
ual’s rational sense by focusing on the consequences of laws and evaluating
the viability or sensibility of those legal rules in light of their social effects.
Utilitarianism is a classic manifestation of result-based ethics. The advan-
tage of utilitarianism as an analytical tool for the copyright system is obvi-
ous: it allows the morality and viability of copyright laws to be quickly
evaluated and justified by measuring their expected utility on collective
welfare.10 Hence, the expected increase in creative production and dissemi-
nation of literary and artistic works for public benefit vindicated the grant
of exclusive rights to authors and publishers. As the principle of utility pro-
vided a plausible account of legislative morality by its protection of human
welfare and its evaluation of the consequences of legislative rules on human
welfare,11 utilitarianism emerged and became the ideal analytical tool to
study and evaluate the copyright system. The emphasis on utility as a tool
for analyzing copyright law has produced numerous economic models
aimed at deciphering the optimal level of copyright protection—where the
amount of exclusive rights granted would be at an ideal point that does not
impinge on public access to creative works.12
8. Sam Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 12–20
(1986). The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 stated
that its basic aim was to be the “constitution of a general Union for the protection of the rights of
authors in their literary works and manuscripts.” Id. at 20. The Convention was, however, intro-
duced to draw large pirate countries into multilateral relations and equalize international protec-
tion of creative works. Id. at 12–20.
9. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 1, adopted Sept.
9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971 and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989). (“The countries to which this Convention
applies constitute a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works.”) (emphasis added).
10. Jeremy Bentham, who embraced utilitarianism as a philosophy and vigorously applied its
welfare-maximizing analysis to a variety of practical problems, believed that “the business of the
legislator . . . is to produce harmony between public and private interests” as each individual’s
pursuit of what he or she believes will maximize individual interest must be balanced against
collective welfare. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 775 (1945).
11. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 10–12 (1990).
12. E.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 71–84 (2003) (creating a model of the welfare effect of copyright, ana-
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However, the innate problem with using social consequences as a
proxy for making value judgments about legal rules is the lack of actual and
firm guidance on what the proper content of law ought to be. The derivation
of individual rights from a subjective consideration of the collective interest
often yields undesirable outcomes because the calculation of benefits and
harms allows for the projection of long-range and future social benefits that
could be used to justify immediate policy decisions. These immediate pol-
icy decisions sometimes carry immense social cost while the projected ben-
efits of future social gains may never even materialize.13 Despite the
intricacies of cost-benefit calculations, the prediction of future conse-
quences from present day actions is still merely a forecast that will not
reveal actual results or consequences until long after policy decisions and
choices about optimal welfare have been made and implemented.
Forecasting potential consequences from immediate choices through
the use of quantitative cost-benefit analyses is easier—qualitative assess-
ments of benefits and risks are more difficult to make because the options
that present themselves as choices are often incommensurable.14 But quan-
titative analysis often allows specialized interest groups with the most eco-
nomic power to influence decisions about optimality and what would
amount to public welfare by presenting evidence of actual monetary gains
lyzing the extent of broadly defined copyright protection to see how this protection can be a
means for promoting efficient allocation of resources); Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The
Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 192
(2006) (suggesting a model for “evaluating the welfare implications of changes in the breadth of
the rights vested in copyright owners . . . . [T]his model establishes a set of metrics by which to
assess specific doctrinal recommendations.”); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good
Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007) (using the “Samuelson
condition” to advocate for analyzing copyrights under markets for impure public goods rather than
pure public goods to reach optimality); Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Ap-
proach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 37–38 (2004) (“This Article argues that
the greater the success of copyright law in generating large numbers of works, the more copyright
law should care about access. . . . It does so by focusing on the economics of product differentia-
tion, a venerable area of study in industrial organization . . . .”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright,
Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 4 (2009)
(discussing the recording industry’s fight against P2P sharing to advocate to treat works of author-
ship as a discrete public good, rather than a continuous public good, whereby “the self-interest of
individual consumers alone can achieve a socially optimal outcome”).
13. STUART HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT 84–85 (1983) (“Persecutions, massacres
and wars have been coolly justified by calculations of the long-range benefit to mankind; and
political pragmatists, in the advanced countries, using cost-benefit analyses prepared for them by
gifted professors, continue to burn and destroy. The utilitarian habit of mind has brought with it a
new abstract cruelty in politics, a dull destructive political righteousness: mechanical, quantitative
thinking, leaden loveless minds setting out their moral calculations in leaden abstract prose, and
more civilized and superstitious people destroyed because of enlightened calculations that have
proved wrong.”).
14. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 37–40 (2004) (criticizing the use of cost-benefit analy-
sis for policies aimed at saving lives, preserving natural resources, and protecting life).
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and losses from particular policy perspectives.15 In the copyright system,
this group has traditionally been private stakeholders in the leading copy-
right industries, such as publishers, movie studios, recording companies,
and collecting societies, and they are generally present at the negotiating
table during the legislative process.16 The different options that are consid-
ered in these policy decisions about copyright law—such as whether to ex-
tend the term of copyright to provide more incentives for creativity or allow
works to fall into the public domain sooner to allow greater public access—
are incommensurable choices because of the incomparability of both op-
tions.17 This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for these options to be
ranked numerically and for their comparative moral worth to be effectively
assessed by any rational decision-making standard.18 As both values of en-
couraging creativity and facilitating access are instrumental towards a given
end (i.e. progress and learning), they should not be the ultimate reasons for
choice and action because decisions made between both options will be
inherently arbitrary and morally unjustified.19
As moral analyses of copyright laws have focused predominantly on
the social consequences of legal rules, literature criticizing the copyright
system has, in the same vein, looked at the results of current policies—a
shrinking public domain, inefficient allocation of public and private rights,
stifling of free expression—to highlight the inefficiencies and inadequacies
of the system.20 Despite these value judgments about the social effects of
15. See NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY,
AND ECONOMICS: RECLAIMING THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA 165 (2008) (describing how the
politicization of the cost-benefit analysis leads to abuse of the political process).
16. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–28 (2001) (examining how Congress al-
lowed industries involved with copyright to decide what they want changed in current copyright
law and then to present Congress with the new legislation).
17. See Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1998)
(explaining that “[t]he incommensurability of options or choices might mean: (1) the incompara-
bility of options or choices, such that no numerical ranking of the options in the order of their
comparative worth is possible; (2) the failure of a particular kind of scale, such as a monetary
scale or a consequentialist scale, to track the comparative worth of options; and (3) the fact that a
scaling procedure (either a particular scaling procedure or any scaling procedure at all) is not the
best procedure by which to choose among options.”).
18. Id. at 1170–71.
19. ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 93 (1999).
20. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
8–11 (2008) (condemning the copyright system for restricting culture to confer a benefit to a
minority of works); WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 6–14 (2011) (advocating for a
complete overhaul of the copyright system to reflect the digital abundance in the world and legis-
lation tested for economic efficiency); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FU-
TURE OF CREATIVITY 18–20, 184–92 (2004) (showing how copyright laws fail to respond to the
Internet and shrink the public domain of ideas, thereby restricting culture and freedom to create);
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 10–12, 120–21 (2008) (remarking on how
copyright should encourage free speech and debate of various ideas, in contrast with the current
system burdening expression); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 15–16 (2012) (“Mine is a complex consequentialist approach that
seeks to expand the purpose of this law beyond incentives and efficiency to promoting the broad
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copyright law, there is a paucity of literature on what the core content of the
law should actually be.21 Policy decisions regarding the desired social con-
sequences of copyright rules cannot be effectively evaluated on moral
grounds when the analysis focuses on the ends and not the means. Instead
the focus should be on better understanding the basic values that are desira-
ble for moral legislation and the type of rules that ought to form the core
content of copyright laws. This question about copyright law’s proper con-
tent is a perennial one for many communities and societies with increasing
humanistic interests and goals who access and use creative expressions
communally, nationally, and globally as a form of public communication to
educate, connect with others, and develop solidarity.22 In an age where pol-
icy options as laid out in the legislative process are incommensurable and
the deficiencies of the copyright calculus is becoming apparent, the more
important question about the proper content of copyright laws must be
asked. The rationality that guides policy decisions concerning creativity,
expression, and authorship for the common good cannot be controlled by a
moral norm that requires arbitrary choices to be made between incompara-
ble values.
This paper draws from two sources to answer the question about copy-
right’s core content. First, legal theories on natural law, requiring man-
made positive laws to be derived from an objective moral premise, support
a proposition that copyright laws have essential self-evident moral content
that may be identified through reason. To be legitimate rules, copyright
laws must abide by the rule of law, be inherently moral, and be ends in
themselves and not instruments to achieve policy goals. Copyright laws
must promote justice and fairness through the manner in which literary and
artistic works are accessed, used, and disseminated by creators, publishers,
and the public. The law must clearly differentiate between proprietary rights
in creative works and economic privileges to use the work, conform to an
ethic of prudence and reasonableness in any action taken to expand or re-
range of values we hold dear in the twenty-first century . . . my book dovetails with the broad
contemporary movement in international intellectual property circles to reconsider this law as a
tool for promoting human development and not GDP or efficiency alone.”).
21. Lewis Hyde does touch upon some basic values, such as the act of self-expression as a
form of reverence for the divine, which may provide ultimate reasons for choice and action. See
LEWIS HYDE, COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART, AND OWNERSHIP 18–22, 78–80 (2010).
22. See Karin Barber, Popular Arts in Africa, 30 AFR. STUD. REV. 1, 13–15, 34–35 (1987)
(discussing the development of a definition of popular arts in Africa and how defining art will
affect its treatment by society); Haidy Geismar, Copyright in Context: Carvings, Carvers, and
Commodities in Vanuatu, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 437, 439 (2005) (arguing “Vanuatu have, over a
lengthy period of time, strategically drawn an analogy between highly specific local entitlements
and more international notions of copyright to assert significant economic and political agency in
local, national, and international domains of exchange.”); Robert French & Keith T. Kernan, Art
and Artifice in Belizean Creole, 8 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 238 (1981) (showing the importance of
speech performance and verbal art for the Belizean Creole communities).
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strict rights, and realize that a cultural ecology must replace the copyright
economy to produce an ethos where creativity in all respect thrives.
Second, this paper draws from Catholic social teachings on the com-
mon good (that would protect human flourishing instead of public welfare),
respect for the life and dignity of the human person (that would identify
with authentic authorship instead of romantic authorship), and correlation
of rights and responsibility (that would impose moral duties instead of
merely granting legal rights). These basic teachings further refine the basic
values that could form the core content of copyright laws and allow non-
arbitrary decisions to be made, as well as offer a framework to inform and
shape appropriate copyright laws and policies. For the progress of science
to be sustained, the core content of copyright laws must protect the condi-
tions that contribute towards authentic forms of authorship and support the
flourishing and thriving of relationship-oriented communities. By identify-
ing core moral content to inform and guide the development of copyright
law and policy, a healthy ecology for the production and distribution of
creative works may emerge to produce greater equity in how literary and
artistic resources are ultimately used in the information economy.
This paper is divided into three parts to make these arguments. Part II
describes the propositions central to natural law theory, such as the central-
ity of the rule of law, the ideas that rules must be inherently moral, and that
laws must be ends in themselves. It suggests that these propositions offer a
workable framework to think about the difficult choices that a copyright
system must make between protecting rights of authors, publishers, and the
public. Part III applies these general propositions to the copyright system
and analyzes how copyright analyses will change as one focuses on the
actual content of the law rather than the ends produced by law. Part IV
considers some of the hard questions that are likely to arise with the propo-
sal that the core content of copyright law can be shaped by natural law and
Catholic social teaching.
II. NATURAL LAW
Natural law is comprised of three interdependent propositions. The
first and most fundamental proposition in natural law theory is that human
choice and action must be directed towards purposes that are intrinsically
good for human flourishing. The second and third propositions comprise
two different sets of principles. The second proposition’s set of principles
provide intermediate moral norms that direct one’s choice and action to-
wards options that may be consistently chosen with a clear intention to fa-
cilitate human flourishing, while the third proposition’s set of principles
present “fully specific moral norms,” which explicitly require or forbid cer-
tain choices, such as the norm that killing an innocent person is never per-
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missible.23 These propositions direct legal analysis to the actual content of
the law and provide normative standards against which decisions for action
may be more rigorously evaluated. By eschewing analyses of a law’s social
or economic result and focusing ethical inquiries on the intrinsic value of
legal rules and political decisions, natural law theory allows reasons for
certain actions and decisions to be examined through critical moral lenses
rather than shroud those reasons under a veil of morality just because they
purport to maximize public welfare. This is an important form of legal anal-
ysis because it requires reasons for action or non-action to be conclusive
and determinative before they would be considered reasonable, rational, and
moral reasons. It also avoids the dangerous presupposition that costs and
benefits can commensurately be balanced in such a way that a decision
maker would be able to know the choice that would bring about the greatest
happiness to the greatest number of people.24
Natural law provides an important framework to think about the copy-
right system and the difficult choices that must be made between the inter-
ests of creators, publishers, and the public in literary and artistic works. A
framework that focuses moral analyses on the reasons for, rather than the
consequences of decisions is especially useful when evaluating the norma-
tive value of copyright laws, where choices between protecting the natural
and economic interest of a work’s creator is incommensurable with societal
interest in accessing the work for educational, cultural, or research uses. As
the interests of the creator and the general public are not comparable on a
scale that would allow anyone to be sure that choosing one over the other
would result in a maximization of public welfare, a choice between either
would be arbitrary.25 A mode of analysis that examines reasons for action
rather than the choices themselves should be a welcomed analytical model
in copyright jurisprudence. Natural law’s reverence for individual dignity
and human flourishing removes arbitrariness from decision-making by di-
recting actions towards the common good and allowing individuals and
communities to realize for themselves basic goods which contribute to their
well-being.26 Creativity and human expression contribute to individual and
communal development in significant ways.27 Copyright laws that embody
the common good from a natural law perspective would therefore protect
literary and artistic works because their protection will allow individuals
and communities to realize for themselves basic goods that support their
23. GEORGE, supra note 19, at 102–04.
24. Id. at 119.
25. See Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 147 (1999) (showing how difficult it is to answer the normative ques-
tion of how much intellectual property protection is required to maximize social welfare).
26. GEORGE, supra note 19, at 107.
27. See Colette Daiute, Adolescents’ Purposeful Uses of Culture, in ART AND HUMAN DEVEL-
OPMENT 169–72, 176–80 (Constance Milbrath & Cynthia Lightfoot eds., 2010) (discussing Vygot-
sky’s theories on creativity and how human development affects culture).
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development and not because their protection will ultimately promote pub-
lic welfare.28
Copyright law today is considered “difficult, complex, and as a whole,
unsatisfactory” because of a lack of foundational jurisprudence—it exists as
a hodgepodge of various principles of “property rights, personal rights, and
monopolies.”29 It aims to protect incentives to create for the purposes of
maximizing public welfare, but it lacks fundamental principles or unifying
concepts that link the notions of creativity, author’s rights, public domain,
and publisher’s rights.30 Natural law, a theory about essential truths con-
necting laws with broad moral precepts, embodies important foundational
principles that may be used to develop the core of copyright laws irrespec-
tive of the aims they seek to achieve, whether they be to protect the author’s
natural rights, public welfare, or the incentive to create. The various notions
about rights, entitlements, and social welfare may be unified through a com-
mon understanding of what it means to have moral laws that protect the
common good and human dignity. Laws that are moral will embody the rule
of law,31 contain rules that are inherently moral,32 and are ends in them-
selves.33 These moral-political ideals central to natural law theory are effec-
tive benchmarks against which copyright laws may be assessed. Thinking
about copyright from a natural law perspective emphasizes the morality of
its core content and ensures that the effects of copyright rules serve the
common good.
A. Centrality of the Rule of Law
Natural law lawyers study the formal features of legal systems to eval-
uate their functions in light of their requirement that the law promotes jus-
tice and protects the common good. Professor Lon Fuller is perhaps most
famous for laying out the eight ways in which a legal system may fail in
this regard.34 The eight ways are: creation of laws on an ad hoc basis, fail-
ure to publicize laws to those affected by them, abuse of retroactive legisla-
28. The catalogue of basic goods varies among natural law lawyers. See GEORGE, supra note
19, at 103 (“Basic human goods provide reasons for action precisely insofar as they are constitu-
tive aspects of human flourishing.”).
29. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 8.
30. Id.
31. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (1980) (stating that natural
law requires the exercise of authority in a community to be in accordance with the rule of law).
32. Positive rules that are inherently moral are derived from natural law, created for moral
purposes, and posited for the sake of the common good. GEORGE, supra note 19, at 109.
33. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
215–19, 227–28 (2006) (arguing that legal instrumentalism erodes the rule of law and ignores the
common good).
34. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (2nd ed. 1969) (stating that a “total failure in
any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in
something that is not properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense
in which a void contract can still be said to be one kind of contract.”).
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tion, failure to make rules understandable, enactment of contradictory rules,
enactment of rules that require affected parties to conduct themselves in
ways beyond their powers, introducing frequent changes to legal rules, and
failure to coordinate rules with their administration.35 According to Profes-
sor Fuller, all eight ways produce a legal system that has completely failed.
From the perspective of a natural law lawyer, who is concerned with policy
makers and legislators making reasoned choices consistent with moral prin-
ciples, laws in themselves must be practically reasonable in that they must
be consistent, fair, just, and attentive to all aspects of human opportunity
and flourishing. Individuals in society, who subject themselves to be gov-
erned by laws of their community to maintain order and guide action, must
be aware of laws before they can be made to comply with them. Retroactive
laws, laws that are incomprehensible or contradictory, and laws that de-
mand more from their subjects than those subjects are capable of, pose a
threat to human dignity by making individuals adhere to rules that cannot
be reasonably complied with. As Professor Fuller pointed out:
[T]here can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can
have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or
is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he
had acted, or was unintelligible, or was contradicted by another
rule of the same system, or commanded the impossible, or
changed every minute.36
Though compliance with these principles may not ensure substantive
justice in the copyright system, these principles establish the rule of law for
legal order. Thus, the rule of law is not a legal rule in the conventional
sense, such as the rule that only expressions and not ideas are protected
through copyright laws.37 Instead, the rule of law is a rule of virtue that
requires laws to be relatively general, stable, and open so that laws may be
followed and obeyed.38 Individual legal rules such as the idea/expression
dichotomy ensure public access to ideas. And while the idea/expression di-
chotomy is a substantive rule about the proper subject matter of copyright
protection, it does not provide legal order to the law because the generality
and ambiguity surrounding its application does not produce certainty in the
law.39 The qualities of clarity, certainty, predictability, and trustworthiness
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
38. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 213–16 (1979) (advocating several principles
for valid laws, including: (1) “all laws should be prospective, open, and clear;” (2) “laws should
be relatively stable;” and (3) “the making of particular laws and (particular) legal orders should be
guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules”).
39. Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV.
321, 324 (1989) (“It is not a doctrine that could be used predictably to put a particular work either
into the public domain or within the author’s exclusive rights; instead, it seems to be an ex post
facto characterization that justifies an outcome based upon other, more concrete, factors. Thus, if
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in how creative expressions and their underlying ideas are shared are essen-
tial elements to the rule of law because they facilitate social interaction and
community growth. These qualities would be desirable in the copyright sys-
tem for their own sake because they provide individuals with the tools they
need to make dignified choices about their creative endeavors.40
However, the qualities of clarity, certainty, predictability, and trust-
worthiness are not evident in the basic rules governing creative production,
such as the rule that only original expressions, and not mere ideas, are pro-
tected. Copyright law, for example, does not define what originality means
even though the law clearly states that it protects “original works of author-
ship.”41 The House Report explained that this phrase was deliberately left
undefined in the current Copyright Act of 1976 to allow the standard for
originality established by the courts under the old law, the Copyright Act of
1909, to be used with the new law.42 Despite this fundamental copyright
requirement that works of authorship be original, the legislature has pro-
vided very little guidance as to what might amount to an original work.43
Courts have inferred that originality would be a feature that emanates from
the act of authorship:
[A]uthorship presumptively connotes originality. Thus the term
“author” is defined as “the beginner . . . or first mover of any-
thing; hence, efficient cause of a thing; creator; originator; . . . a
composer, as distinguished from an editor, translator or com-
piler.” In music, “to compose” is defined as “to construct by
mental labor; to design and execute, or put together, in a manner
involving the adaptation of forms of expression to ideas, or to the
laws of harmony or proportion.” And in the literary field, which
comprehends—though with an occasional cynical doubt—such
items as the lyrics for popular songs, “to write” signifies, “to
frame or combine ideas, and express them in written words; to
compose, as an author.”44
Despite the courts’ pronouncement that an original work begins with
an act of authorship, the level of authorial activity that gives rise to exclu-
sive property-type rights in creative works remains unclear. A creator is not
the outcome in a particular case is to be infringement, the work is deemed to be protectable
expression; if the outcome is to be noninfringment, then the work is described as an ‘idea.’”).
40. FINNIS, supra note 31, at 271–72 (discussing how the extension of law into new subject
areas, such as consumer-supplier relations, helps to protect self-direction and freedom from some
types of manipulation).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
42. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) (stating that the “phrase ‘original works of author-
ship,’ which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of
originality established by the courts under the present copyright statute [the 1909 Act]”).
43. The 1909 Act neither defined originality nor expressly required that works be original
before they can be protected. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, PAUL MARCUS, DAVID A. MYERS & DAVID
NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT 3 (7th ed. 2005).
44. Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Neb., 58 F. Supp. 523, 531 (D. Neb. 1944)
(quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary, 1925).
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entitled to a copyright based on hard work and labor; what the law requires
is creative expression.45 Yet, a creator need not make appreciable artistic
contributions to the body of creative works to be entitled to exclusive
rights.46 Anything more than mere trivial variations of another artist’s work
would satisfy the requirement of originality and be sufficient for a work to
be protected.47 The requirement of originality, while a low standard, sets
the baseline for distinguishing protectable works from non-protectable
works and private exclusive rights from public interests integral to any
property rights system. But this legal threshold does not provide the predict-
ability in the law so essential for the ordering of private affairs in a just and
equitable legal system that adheres to the rule of law. The low standard for
acquiring exclusive rights allocates rights over creative expressions in such
a way that it is difficult to know where the proper boundaries of private
rights lie. One could, for example, easily infringe a copyright without the
deliberate intent to infringe through the doctrine of subconscious copying,
which imposes liability on a defendant who accidentally reproduces a work
from prior exposures to it.48 The fair use doctrine, which allows unautho-
rized uses of creative works in circumstances that are considered fair, is
also notoriously ambiguous to the point that creators of literary and artistic
works are not able to decisively plan a course of creative development for
fear of litigation.49
It is essential for the copyright system to clarify legal rules that set the
balance between private property claims of individuals and the collective
interest in personal liberty for the rule of law to thrive. The rule of law
compels the passing of rules through positive law that protects individual
rights, but at the same time, provides members of society with clear, con-
cise, and predictable rules that may be easily obeyed. The late Ronald
Dworkin famously advanced a view of the rule of law that ultimately safe-
guards individual rights above collective interests.50 In this sense, the copy-
right system must protect rights of individual creators in their expressions.
Additionally, the rule of law must also compel the promulgation of laws
that are capable of being obeyed. As Joseph Raz explains, an individual can
conform to the law only if he has knowledge about the rules: “if the law is
to be obeyed it must be capable of guiding the behavior of its subjects. It
45. See Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991).
46. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–50 (1903) (artistic
merit is not a prerequisite to copyright).
47. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951).
48. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482–83 (9th Cir. 2000).
49. See RICHARD L. SCHUR, PARODIES OF OWNERSHIP: HIP-HOP AESTHETICS AND INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW 103 (2009) (arguing that the ambiguity of the fair-use doctrine has had a
chilling effect on some artistic activity, especially that of African American artists, writers, and
musicians).
50. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1978).
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must be such that they can find out what it is and act on it.”51 Copyright
rules setting boundaries between individual rights and public interest must
be further clarified to provide members of society with clearer and better
guidance in the use and production of creative works.
B. Rules Must Be Inherently Moral
To be legitimate legal rules, rules must also be inherently moral in that
they must be just. In this respect, Michael S. Moore has stated that “neces-
sarily, law cannot be too unjust and still be law.”52 To a natural law lawyer,
justice is one of the fundamental essentials that a law must embody.53 Thus,
for Aristotle, a law that is just must have certain attributes of proportionality
where individuals can expect to receive their share of entitlement or retribu-
tion in proportion to their action in society.54 As an example, rights, pow-
ers, and privileges granted by the state should be proportionate to one’s
contribution to society. Conversely, punishment meted out for a crime must
be commensurable with the wrongful act. Hence, punishing a person justly
means punishing in proportion to the crime.55 The fairness of many of the
rules in the copyright system is, from this vantage point, questionable be-
cause of the pronounced disproportionality of punishment to the infringing
act.56
In Sony Music Entertainment v. Cassette Production, Inc.,57 $9.1 mil-
lion was awarded for the willful piracy of ninety-one sound recordings be-
longing to Sony at $100,000 per sound recording as statutory damages.
Sony managed to establish that the defendant had willfully infringed their
copyright by the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the sound
recordings, and the court found that the “particularly egregious and willful
nature of [the defendant’s] conduct” justified the amount of the award.58
The exercise of discretion by the court in the award of statutory damages is,
51. RAZ, supra note 38, at 214.
52. MICHAEL S. MOORE, EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE 304 (2000).
53. Id. at 305.
54. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 89 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2000) (Aristotle’s view of proportional justice was based on a reciprocity of exchange be-
tween individuals that binds them together in a society; thus where one has received a gracious
gesture from another, one should be obliged to perform a “return service” and be gracious by
oneself, which would consequently produce what Aristotle called “proportionate reciprocation”).
55. See THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 719 (Michel Ro-
senfeld & Andra´s Sajo´ eds., 2012).
56. The Copyright Act of 1976 allows a copyright owner to elect to recover statutory dam-
ages instead of actual damages and profits with respect to any one work for a sum not less than
$750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In cases where the
copyright owner sustains the burden of proving infringement, and the court finds that such in-
fringement was committed willfully, the court may in its discretion increase the award of statutory
damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. Id. at § 504(c)(2).
57. 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1198 (D.N.J. 1996).
58. Id. at 1203.
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in the court’s view, “the only deterrent that will have any effect on a Defen-
dant” and in the future, prevent willful infringing acts.59
The award of $9.1 million to Sony in this case may have far exceeded
the necessary amount to serve as a deterrent for willful infringement. Crimi-
nal law—whether intending to punish, deter, incapacitate, or rehabilitate the
offender60—imposes some form of punishment on the individual who is
convicted of committing the offense.61 The teachings of natural law, how-
ever, require that the use of punishment to protect any ideal of social justice
must “be proportionate to the good sought and must use the least destruc-
tive means of achieving that good.”62 Thus, while a cold-blooded murderer
may have committed a heinous crime, seeking the common good would
require the protection of society and the murderer, even as the urge to repay
the murderer in kind stirs among other members of society. Looking at the
death penalty and life imprisonment from a natural law perspective, life
imprisonment usually would serve the common good by protecting society
from the murderer while respecting the dignity of the criminal.63 The least
destructive or harmful means of achieving the common good must be
chosen.
Likewise in copyright law, the common good must also be sought as
the law seeks to deter willful infringement of copyrighted works. In this
respect, several options besides statutory damages are available to the
courts—the grant of actual damages and profits as measured by lost profits
and lost sales64 and injunctive relief to prevent and restrain further infringe-
ment of the copyright.65 Arguably, the grant of actual damages and profits
is an effective deterrent against willful infringement if the aim of the in-
fringer is to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work to undercut the
market for the original. In Sony, the defendant was estimated to have made
as much as $2 million in profits from the distribution and sale of the sound
recordings.66 An award of this amount to Sony would act as a deterrent, as
the infringer is deprived of the anticipated gains from the infringement and
59. Id.
60. The purposes of the criminal law exist to varying degrees in different types of regulation
and penal codes and present a multi-faceted value system for the law. On the relationship between
these different aims of the law with the criminal system, see generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
61. See, e.g., Ian A.T. McLean, Criminal Law and Natural Law, in COMMON TRUTHS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL LAW 259, 261 (Edward B. McLean ed., 2004) (stating that criminal
law is a unique body of law because “it prefers, in first resort, violence as a response to activity
that deviates from a rule”; a person who commits a crime, for example, may have his liberty
deprived, home searched, and be compelled to provide intimate parts of his being such as breath,
blood, urine, skin, or hair samples for investigation).
62. Id. at 275.
63. Id. at 275–76.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
66. 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1198, 1201 (D.N.J. 1996).
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is discouraged from engaging in future acts of infringement. The award of
statutory damages of up to $100,000 for the infringement of one sound re-
cording is excessive and disproportionate. It is also arguable in this case
that injunctive relief should not be granted where the copyright owner is not
the natural author of the work and does not have a personal connection with
its expression.67
To be inherently moral, the rules on copyright remedies must secure
proportionate deterrence to wrongful acts of infringement and be imposed
for the common good instead of the protection of the copyright owner’s
market interest. The law may also need to avoid strict-liability rules for
infringement, where an innocent infringer may still be liable for an act of
infringement despite a lack of knowledge that he is committing an act of
infringement68 and to avoid punishing individuals for activities they subjec-
tively believe to be legitimate. Fault-based liability is important in ensuring
that copyright rules are inherently moral because the use of expressions in
itself is not a wrongful act. In fact, some scholars believe that use of crea-
tive resources is desirable to long-term technological, economic, and cul-
tural development.69 Unduly harsh punishment for the use and distribution
of creative works—whether in the form of disproportionate punishment or
strict-liability—will only deter the sharing of cultural resources that would
ultimately facilitate individual expression for the common good.
C. Laws Must Be Ends in Themselves
To conform to natural law, copyright laws must also be ends in them-
selves rather than means to an end. As ends in themselves, laws must seek
the common good of society and those they govern. As Baron de Montes-
quieu explained, positive laws are an embodiment of social and group cohe-
siveness—man’s natural desire to be united as a community.70 The
government must therefore pass laws for the good of the people. St.
Thomas Aquinas, in the same light, saw every individual as a “part of a
67. See Alina Ng, Literary Property and Copyright, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 531
(2012) (arguing that injunctive relief should only be granted to authors of a work; that such rights
of authors be protected by a property rule while the rights of publishers and other copyright
owners, who are not natural authors of the work, be protected by a liability rule).
68. See Buck v. Jewell-Lasalle Realty Co. 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (stating “[i]ntention to
infringe is not essential under the [Copyright] [A]ct”).
69. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1032 (2005) (suggesting that “the effort to permit inventors to capture the full social
value of their invention . . . [is] fundamentally misguided”); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A.
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258 (2007) (arguing that contrary to common as-
sumptions, “spillovers actually encourage greater innovation”).
70. These positive laws govern nations and the “united strengths of individuals.” A govern-
ment that is “most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the humor and disposition
of the people in whose favor it is established.” BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 5–6
(2002).
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perfect whole that is the community.”71 “Therefore law must concern itself
in particular with the happiness of the community;”72 where the “intention
of the legislator is directed at the true good, (i.e., the common good) and
regulated according to the principles of divine justice, it follows that the law
will make men good absolutely.”73 This non-instrumental quality of the
law, where the law possesses a core integrity that is tied to the service of the
common good, is important for the copyright system because its rules will
protect expressive and culturally significant activities that are integral to the
dignity and well-being of individuals. The ability of individuals to realize
for themselves basic goods, such as the freedom to create and express, will
allow human nature to flourish through the sharing and dissemination of
creative resources, cultural expressions, and intellectual products. This form
of human flourishing can only be supported when the law is not used as an
instrument for policy goals and is instead an end in itself.
Professor Brian Z. Tamanaha has, however, pointed out that for more
than two hundred years, legal jurisprudence in the United States has tended
to ignore the ideal that laws must be limited by fundamental principles of
the rule of law and represent the common good of society.74 As Professor
Tamanaha suggested, this may have been attributable to a variety of rea-
sons, including:
The implications of the Enlightenment, the secularization of soci-
ety, doubts about the existence of objective moral principles, a
culturally heterogeneous and class-differentiated populace,
pitched battles within society among groups with conflicting eco-
nomic interests in the late nineteenth century, an increasingly spe-
cialized economy with complex regulatory regimes far beyond
the ken of common law concepts, [and] the disenchantment of the
world in the twentieth century . . . .75
More importantly, Professor Tamanaha observes that after the “de-
nouement” of distancing the law from its core integrity, “the only substan-
tive restrictions on legislation were those found in the words of the
Constitution.”76 One may observe that without any core moral content that
aims to protect the common good, copyright laws may embody policy goals
set by Congress with Congress’s powers limited only by the patent and
copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution.77
71. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 44 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., 1988).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 47.
74. TAMANAHA, supra note 33, at 215.
75. Id. at 217.
76. Id.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states that “Congress shall have Power To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”
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Nevertheless, the twin landmark Supreme Court cases of Eldred v.
Ashcroft78 and Golan v. Holder79 demonstrate that the constitutional limita-
tion on Congress’s power does not provide any assurance that the common
good will be protected. In Eldred, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, which delayed a work’s
entry into the public domain by twenty years,80 deciding that Congress was
the better judge of what was necessary to encourage “American and other
authors to create and disseminate their work in the United States.”81 The
Court went on to state that courts were “not at liberty to second-guess con-
gressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however de-
batable or arguably unwise they may be.”82 It was Congress’s prerogative
to extend the copyright term if the extension would ensure an equal protec-
tion of American works in Europe and provide incentives for the creation
and dissemination of works in the United States.83 In Golan, the Court up-
held the constitutionality of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act, a 1994 law
passed by Congress to fulfill the trade obligations under the Trade Related
International Property Rights Agreement.84 Section 514 of the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act restored copyright to works that were in the public
domain for reasons other than the expiration of copyright.85 Passed to fulfill
trade obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreement and to perfect the
implementation of the Berne Convention,86 the law served national trade
policies rather than the common good. One may observe from both Eldred
and Golan that the only constitutional limitation Congress had under the
copyright clause is that Congress may pass laws that promote the progress
of science within its constitutional authority. And the courts in Eldred and
Golan made it clear that they will not second-guess the rational choices that
Congress makes while acting within its authority even if those choices may
not be in the interest of the common good.
78. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
79. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
80. 537 U.S. at 204; 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
81. 537 U.S. at 206–08.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 205–06.
84. See 132 S. Ct. at 894 (holding that passage of section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ment Act was within the power of the political branches, and that the court is satisfied that it does
not “encounter any constitutional shoal”).
85. Works that should be protected by copyright may fall into the public domain in one of
three ways: (1) the United States did not protect works from the country of origin at the time the
work was published; (2) the work is a sound recording that was fixed before the United States
started protecting sound recordings as a copyrightable work in 1972; and (3) the author of the
work had not complied with certain statutory formalities in the United States, such as the require-
ment that the work be registered, when the work was produced. In 1994, section 514 was codified
in the U.S. Copyright Act as 17 U.S.C.A. § 104A, which treats restored work as “if the work
never entered the public domain in the United States.” Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 1994
§ 514, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (a)(1)(B) (2006).
86. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877–78 (providing a brief synopsis of the United States’ imple-
mentation of Berne).
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Both cases show copyright law being used as a means or instrument to
an end—the promotion of the progress of science. They demonstrate that
the law’s core content need not be consistent with any objective standard of
morality. Copyright laws here were instruments to further trade or social
policies and could be filled with “congressional determinations and policy
judgments.”87 By adopting a deferential view towards such determinations
and judgments, courts have also renounced the common good in copyright
law; these laws are constitutional as long as the law promotes the progress
of science. Nonetheless, copyright law that serves the common good must
not only be constitutional. It must have a core integrity that will determine
the proper content of the law and prevent it from being used as an instru-
ment to pursue trade or social policies. When law is seen as an end in itself,
one would understand the purpose of the law as serving the common good
and its core content comprising fundamental principles of right and wrong.
When copyright laws are passed as ends in themselves, they will allow cre-
ators and users of creative works to engage with literary and artistic re-
sources in ways that will ultimately support human flourishing in society.
III. SHAPING APPROPRIATE COPYRIGHT LAWS AND POLICIES
The first proposition of natural law identified in Part II encompasses
broad rules that ensure the conformity of positive law to natural law. These
universal and general rules apply across the board to various legal regimes
and different areas of the law. Second-level principles are more concrete,
direct, and instructive moral principles that would help refine the core con-
tent of copyright laws. Catholic social teaching offers specific guidance that
may be used to shape the core content of copyright law. Teachings on the
common good that emphasize human flourishing instead of public welfare,
respect for the life and dignity of the human person, and the correlation of
rights and responsibility provide a more specific set of principles to inform
and shape appropriate copyright laws and policies.
A. Common Good and Human Flourishing
Copyright law may be reoriented towards the common good and
human flourishing and away from public welfare in the utilitarian model
with natural law. With reorientation, a human and cultural ecology that de-
pends on an interconnected network of relationships for growth would
probably replace the system of economic incentives. Conceivably, a moral
norm for the common good would mandate that literary and artistic works
be made more accessible to fair non-commercial uses of such works to al-
low education, research, and cultural experiences to thrive within smaller
communities and local groups. The principle of subsidiarity in Catholic so-
cial teaching emphasizes limiting the role of the nation state and govern-
87. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208.
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ment in the organization and activities of smaller and lesser social orders
such as individuals, family units, and organic unions. Government’s role in
society is to serve communities and social activities without overt interfer-
ence and management. The principle protects individual freedom, encour-
ages personal initiative, and reduces government bureaucracy by requiring
states to enable their citizens in their individual and communal capacities so
that they may readily engage in activities that promote human flourishing.
The principle of subsidiarity thus states that:
[A] community of a higher order should not interfere in the inter-
nal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its
functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to
coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society,
always with a view to the common good.88
But it is important to realize that the modern nation state and the capi-
talist economy may covertly “curtail, absorb, or undermine the functions of
more organic local communities” as one thinks about the common good and
protection of the ability of lower order communities to flourish.89 As Joshua
P. Hochschild explains:
[T]he principle of subsidiarity does much more than provide an-
other argument against the grasping nation state. For one thing, its
scope is wider. Even if papal documents most often find occasion
to invoke the principle when discussing the state, the principle is
concerned not narrowly with specifically public, state power, but
with general relationships between parts and wholes in any com-
munity. It can apply not only to different levels of government,
but also within families and private associations, within corporate
administration, within ecclesial polities, or within different parts
of the economic order.90
The market for copyrighted works, which replaced the patronage sys-
tem as the primary form of remuneration for authors,91 interferes with the
types of creative works that are produced to a large extent. Judge Leval
remarked in his decision in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,
that “[t]he copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the
incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the
public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge . . . . The profit
88. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH NO. 1883 (Doubleday 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus [Encyclical Letter on the Hundreth
Anniversary of Rerum Novarum], ¶ 48 (1991), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html).
89. Joshua P. Hochschild, Natural Law: St. Thomas Aquinas and the Role of Reason in So-
cial Order, in THE HEART OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: ITS ORIGINS AND CONTEMPORARY
SIGNIFICANCE 113, 120 (David Matzko McCarthy ed., 2009).
90. Id.
91. For a historiography of the copyright market, see WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND
THE MARKET, supra note 2.
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motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”92 The emphasis
on market profits as the primary motivation for creativity in the copyright
system undermines individual freedom to be truly creative by encouraging
authors to produce for the masses.93 But, the emergence of the Internet has
allowed collaboration for social production of creative materials such as
Wikipedia and other forms of open-source content through peer-to-peer net-
works in ways that are antithetical to the market.94
The very existence of the market for creative works will nonetheless
undermine the principle of solidarity in Catholic social teaching as the mar-
ket regulates the relationship between creator and his audience. The ability
of copyright owners to set super-competitive market prices for the use of
their work prevents most individuals and local communities from using the
work to create new types of content or engage in free speech with the con-
tent. Market control by copyright owners also produces barriers to competi-
tion from less established creators and restricts their ability to engage in
free expression.95 The appropriation of indigenous or grassroots expression
by larger corporations without proper acknowledgement of the source and
origin of the expression will also undermine the common good and prevent
human flourishing from the production of creative works such as music, art,
and literature. For example, the appropriation of Solomon Linda’s “Mbube”
by Peter Seeger (who turned the song into “Wimoweh” in the 1950s), which
was rewritten as “The Lion Sleeps Tonight” by American music legend
George Weiss without acknowledgement or attribution—while claiming
copyright over the song—is a direct interference by a conglomerate with
folk music and the communal life of African tribes, which again clearly
undermines the principle of solidarity.96 To conform to the principle of soli-
darity, it is important for copyright laws to support creative activities of
lower order communities, such as tribes, families, and social groups, by
protecting their expressions from appropriation and coordinating their activ-
ities with the rest of society, which includes large copyright producers and
other users of creative works, in ways that will allow creators from these
communities to flourish and thrive as human beings.
92. 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
93. For the effect of the market on creativity, see Alina Ng, The Author’s Rights in Literary
and Artistic Works, 9 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 453, 468 (2009) (arguing that since
the author’s market reward for creativity will be based on how much the paying public are willing
to pay for the work, authors have the incentive to produce works that have the widest public
appeal).
94. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006) (arguing that the
“networked information economy” is displacing the industrial information economy, resulting in
the increased importance of nonmarket and nonproprietary motivations and organizational forms
to the information production system).
95. NETANEL, supra note 20, at 131.
96. SUNDER, supra note 20, at 87.
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B. Authentic Authorship and Human Dignity
With the focus on human dignity as emphasized in Catholic social
teaching, one could also observe a lessening of emphasis on notions of the
romantic author and genius creator, used primarily by book sellers and book
publishers to justify copyright ownership and establish the author as the
proprietor of the work as the modern literary market grew.97 Contemporary
copyright scholars such as Peter Jaszi, Martha Woodmansee, and Jessica
Litman, however, have pointed out that these notions are problematic be-
cause the idea that an individual produces something that is wholly original
is not a true reflection of how creative works are actually produced. Authors
are seldom entirely original and most creative works are actually derivative,
being produced through the use and reuse of existing literary and artistic
materials.98 The notion of the author and authorship as an activity has been
deconstructed and rendered void of any real meaning. As Jaszi explains,
legal scholars have tended “to mythologize ‘authorship,’ leading them to
fail (or refuse) to recognize the foundational concept for what it is—a cul-
turally, politically, economically, and socially constructed category rather
than a real or natural one.”99 This has, in turn, been used to entrench the
values of possessive individualism and market commodification of creative
works and can be used to “interfere with the further development and
smooth functioning of that market.”100
However, there will likely be a shift from emphasis on originality, in-
genuity, and individualism toward authenticity, perceptiveness, and com-
munality as copyright laws begin to acknowledge the human dignity
inherent to expressive endeavors, the process of creativity, and the pursuit
of knowledge. This, in turn, will rightfully identify the individual as the
source and actual creator of the work. Despite post-modern literary critics
such as Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes, who have denounced the au-
tonomous individuality of an author in relation to his written words,101
97. See Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of
Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 56 (1988) (discussing “the emergence of the mass
market for books, the valorization of original genius, and the development of the Lockean dis-
course of possessive individualism” during the period of the legal and commercial struggle over
copyright).
98. WOODMANSEE, supra note 2, at 36 (noting that authors were never regarded as distinctly
and personally responsible for their creations before the mid-eighteenth century); Peter Jaszi, To-
ward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 460
(1991); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965 (1990).
99. Jaszi, supra note 98, at 459.
100. Id. at 501.
101. See Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142, 142 (Stephen
Heath trans., 1977) (“As soon as a fact is narrated no longer with a view to acting directly on
reality but intransitively, . . . finally outside of any function other than that of the very practice of
the symbol itself, this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his
own death, writing begins.”); MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-
MEMORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 114, 116–17 (Donald F. Bouchard ed.,
Sherry Simon trans. 1977) (arguing that modern writing has “freed itself from the necessity of
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Catholic social teaching maintains that the lives of individual human beings
are of utmost importance and that human dignity is the foundation for any
moral vision of a just society. It thus compels the acceptance of the author
of creative works to be a human person who should rightfully be entitled to
engage in the creative process and expression as a basic human good.102
Since human beings are made in the image of God and flourish when in
communion with the divine and with community, the act of creation and
expression is a uniquely human activity that is rooted in humanity.103 One
would suggest that creativity and authorship is not, as more contemporary
scholars argue, socially constructed. There is an inherent human dignity to
the act of creativity, which is not connected to the commodification and sale
of creative works on the market. To deny that basic humanity in expression
would be to do violence to the human person.104
If the copyright system recognizes natural law as an appropriate foun-
dation for its jurisprudence, then the human author must take center-stage
and be protected differently. The law’s current emphasis on originality
would likely continue, but since the requirement for creativity is so low,105
there may not necessarily be any personal connection between the author
and the work. If so, arguably, the law need not protect the work with a
property rule and grant injunctions when the work is infringed.106 For cor-
porate works, there is the same lack of personal connection between the
work and a creator employed by a corporation. In cases where the infringe-
ment involves a work-for-hire, the rights of the corporate copyright owner
should only be protected by a liability rule.107 On the other hand, in in-
stances where the work may be authentically attributed to the author, in that
the author is the clear producer of the work even if the work is derivative of
another, there will be a personal connection between author and the work.
expression” and that a link between writing and death is “manifested in the total effacement of the
individual characteristics of the writer” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
102. See MARY J. MCDONOUGH, CAN A HEALTH CARE MARKET BE MORAL?: A CATHOLIC
VISION 32 (2007) (arguing that the right to full human development requires basic rights and that
“to achieve these rights, people must be able to participate in the economic, political, and social
processes that affect their lives”).
103. See id. (“Because all people are created in the image of God, they have an innate and
inalienable value or dignity. . . . The specifics of human dignity can be ascertained only by view-
ing the individual person within his or her particular societal context and in relation to other
people.”).
104. In Catholic social teaching, violence is “any human action that causes harm to the life or
dignity of another person.” JERRY WINDLEY-DAOUST, LIVING JUSTICE AND PEACE: CATHOLIC SO-
CIAL TEACHING IN PRACTICE 290 (2nd ed. 2008).
105. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976); NIMMER ET AL., supra note 43, at 3.
106. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (arguing that “entitle-
ments,” which are protected by property, liability, or inalienability rules, can be integrated with
Tort law concepts allowing state judgment regarding the enforcement of competing
“entitlements”).
107. Cf. id. at 1106–10 (discussing liability rules in the negotiation and valuation of property
entitlements).
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Famous works have been derivative, such as John Milton’s Paradise
Lost,108 but may nonetheless be considered an authentic work of a human
author in that the work may be clearly attributable to the author. In such
cases, the author’s rights should be protected by a property rule that would
grant injunctive relief to prevent further use of the work in situations where
the use conflicts with the author’s personal and creative interest. To justify
the grant of an injunction for infringement of creative works, the law must
expect something more than a minimal degree of creativity from the author;
the law must expect authentic creations that resonate with an individual
author’s basic human need to express and create. A grant of injunctive relief
should protect the author’s human dignity and not his or her commercial
interests. Conceivably, the protection of human dignity would require the
separation of personal and economic interests in creative works with differ-
ent rights and remedial action for infringement of each right.
C. Moral Duties as a Corollary to Legal Rights
While Catholic social teaching acknowledges individual rights to basic
goods in society, it also emphasizes individual responsibility to the commu-
nity in which one lives and works, and on a larger scale, to society as a
whole. Pope John XXIII, in his Encyclical Establishing Universal Peace in
Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty, Pacem in Terris, stated that natural
rights of man “are inextricably bound up with as many duties, all applying
to one and the same person.”109 These natural rights and duties “derive their
origin, their sustenance, and their indestructibility from natural law, which
in conferring the one imposes the other.”110 The Pope gave the following
examples of natural rights and corresponding duties:
[T]he right to live involves the duty to preserve one’s life; the
right to a decent standard of living, the duty to live in a becoming
fashion; the right to be free to seek out the truth, the duty to
devote oneself to an ever deeper and wider search for it.111
The Pope goes on to state:
Once this is admitted, it follows that in human society one man’s
natural right gives rise to a corresponding duty in other men; the
duty, that is, of recognizing and respecting that right. Every basic
human right draws its authoritative force from the natural law,
which confers it and attaches to it its respective duty. Hence, to
claim one’s rights and ignore one’s duties, or only half fulfill
them, is like building a house with one hand and tearing it down
108. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST (Gordon Teskey ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 2005).
109. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris [Encyclical Letter on Establishing Universal Peace in
Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty], ¶ 28 (1963), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html.
110. Id.
111. Id. at ¶ 29.
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with the other . . . . Since men are social by nature, they must live
together and consult each other’s interests. That men should rec-
ognize and perform their respective rights and duties is imperative
to a well ordered society. But the result will be that each individ-
ual will make his whole-hearted contribution to the creation of a
civic order in which rights and duties are ever more diligently and
more effectively observed.112
Thus, in the copyright system, the grant of rights in creative works
must be accompanied by certain moral duties. The grant of exclusive rights
under section 106 of the Copyright Act113 should be accompanied by the
moral duty to make these works reasonably accessible to the public. Copy-
right owners have moral duties to avoid the imposition of monopoly prices
that could prevent easy access to works by the general population.114 Copy-
right owners should also, as a form of moral duty to make works more
accessible to the public, cease the practice of moratorium, where works are
removed from the market to keep demand and prices for the work high.115
The essential facilities doctrine in antitrust laws, which allows a market
competitor to gain reasonable access to a monopolist’s product or service in
order to compete with the monopolist,116 may provide a model by which
duties to provide public access to creative works may be carved out by the
law.117 Copyright laws would have to introduce reasonable restraints in
how works are produced and used by copyright owners and other members
in society to ensure that individual creators have the freedom to express
themselves in ways that, as a whole, affirm the dignity of the person and
promote human flourishing. To ensure the common good, rights of creators,
publishers, and society as a whole must be tempered with moral duties to
seek the common good.
Copyright law must also incorporate the principle of subsidiarity when
thinking about moral duties as a corollary to natural and legal rights. Sub-
sidiarity holds that there is a responsibility to serve lesser communities that
112. Id. at ¶¶ 30–31.
113. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
114. Cf. NETANEL, supra note 20, at 131 (discussing the power of holders of copyrights in
popular and iconic works over markets and expression).
115. See Alina Ng, Copyright and Moral Norms, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 57, 92 (2012) (dis-
cussing the adverse effects of the practice of moratorium on society).
116. Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust Laws, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 446 (2002).
117. See Thomas Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 44 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 211, 213 (1999) (arguing that the essential facilities doctrine could be used as a
“method for imposing a duty to share one’s intellectual property”); see also Case C-418/01, IMS
Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039 (discussing the
essential facilities doctrine and concluding that “the refusal to grant a license for the use of an
intangible asset protected by copyright entails an abuse of a dominant position” where the refusal
is not objectively justifiable and the asset is essential to operating in a secondary market where the
refusal of the license would result in the elimination of competition in that secondary market).
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accompanies the recognition of rights and privileges. As Professor Hoch-
schild states:
[T]he principle of subsidiarity is not so much a principle about
rights—the license to act without interference from above—as it
is about duties or vocational responsibilities. Papal documents use
the term munus, often translated as “task,” “role,” or “function,”
but the real sense of the term is mission or vocation, a gift of
service. Thus it may be advisable to avoid altogether using the
language of rights or even proper functions in characterizing the
principle of subsidiarity; one scholar of Catholic social teachings
describes it instead as a principle regulating the plurality of gifts
within a community.118
Since positive law cannot determine nor dictate the function or gift of
an individual or a community in a society, an important function of positive
law would be to recognize individual and communal functions or gifts de-
termined by natural law and support their flourishing. The primary task for
the government is therefore to “recognize and foster the natural ordering of
social gifts,”119 rather than to distribute creative resources through the allo-
cation of rights. Rights to use creative resources, whether granted under
section 106 of the Copyright Act or through fair use,120 would implicate
moral duties to act responsibly toward the common good.
IV. THE HARD QUESTIONS
The proposal that natural law and Catholic social teaching could help
shape the core content of copyright law raises hard questions. The most
difficult question to answer is probably how one would reconcile the teach-
ing that there are basic moral norms that are common to all with the observ-
able fact that we live in a pluralistic society with different moral values,
aims, and aspirations. Perhaps the strongest objection to a natural law con-
ception of copyright is that there is more disagreement about the moral
worth of particular actions taken by the law to facilitate and encourage crea-
tive production. If universal moral principles were discernible by everyone,
then there would be no difficulty in choosing one course of action over
another. For example, it should be easy for the law to decide between al-
lowing free use of creative works where the user is not a market competitor
of the copyright owner and disallowing all unauthorized uses of creative
works to protect the copyright owner’s market. But it is not as easy as it
would seem, as the law struggles together with copyright proponents and
118. Hochschild, supra note 89, at 121 (citing Russell Hittinger, Social Roles and Ruling
Virtues in Catholic Social Doctrine, 16 ANNALES THEOLOGICI 295, 301–02 (2002) (It.)).
119. Id.
120. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (arguing that the
courts and Congress have employed fair use to “permit uncompensated transfers that are socially
desirable but not capable of effectuation through the market”).
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opponents to maintain a workable balance between public rights and private
entitlements.121 Moral choices about what is the correct human action are
not easily discoverable. Utilitarian choices that measure the sum of total
happiness for the greatest number of people would seem the easier moral
solution regardless of its shortcomings as a normative theory.
Despite the difficulty in identifying the correct choice of action ac-
cording to natural law teachings, it is important to note that there is, as
Professor Hochschild observes, a “surprising degree of agreement, across
times and cultures, about the basic outlines of good human action.”122 For
example, the Pauline Principle that “[e]vil may not be done for the sake of
good”123 reappears in Mahatma Ghandhi’s teachings on non-violent resis-
tance.124 Catholic teachings on love for one’s neighbors can also be found
in Buddhist teachings about loving kindness in the world.125 Teachings
about the solidarity of family and communal life can be found in Africa’s
respect for the primacy of community.126 And teachings about the natural
order of life can be found in the teachings of Greek127 and Chinese philoso-
phy.128 There is a commonality that exists in humanity that unites human
beings as individuals. The correct choice of action would be in accordance
with these principles. Additionally, introducing universal moral principles
that are discernible through practical reason into the copyright system does
not mean that these principles are easily identified. One would have to en-
gage in rigorous moral inquiry to arrive at the morally right decision.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper calls for a new normative standard for the copyright sys-
tem—one that requires moral principles to be introduced into the copyright
121. For an overview of the struggle to reclaim public rights to use creative works, see PATRI-
CIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT BALANCE BACK IN COPY-
RIGHT (2011).
122. Hochschild, supra note 89, at 117.
123. JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 109 (1983).
124. See RICHARD DEATS, MAHATMA GANDHI: NONVIOLENT LIBERATOR 113–14 (2005) (quot-
ing Mahatma Gandhi) (“I would say ‘means are everything.’ As the means, so the end. Violent
means will give violent swaraj. . . . There is no wall of separation between means and end.”).
125. See SANGHARAKSHITA, LIVING WITH KINDNESS: THE BUDDHA’S TEACHING ON METTA
11–14 (2004) (describing “metta,” which can be translated to loving-kindness, as deep concern for
the “well-being, happiness, and prosperity of the object of your metta, be that a person, an animal,
or any other being”).
126. See STAN CHU ILO, THE FACE OF AFRICA 306 (2006) (“The life of society is as important
as the life of the individual, because the individual lives in time but the society is prior to the
individual and outlives the individual.”).
127. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 114–15 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., 2000) (discuss-
ing practical wisdom as a natural state of being).
128. See Dorothy Sisk, Ethical Perspectives, in DIVERSITY IN GIFTED EDUCATION 168, 172
(Belle Wallace & Gillian Eriksson eds., 2006) (describing the tenet of Taoism for achieving
human happiness as “following the natural order, acting spontaneously and trusting instinctive
knowledge”).
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system as foundational precepts. This paper also points out the shortcom-
ings of utilitarianism as a basis for the copyright system, primarily because
the values assigned to particular normative choices that are made are not
commensurable on a definite scale. Natural law teachings, which form the
central tenet of Catholic social teaching, offer an alternative but very appro-
priate normative theory that could provide much needed direction on how
creative works ought to be produced and used in society. Individual expres-
sion is a fundamental activity and a product of being human. Our humanity
requires our expressions to be authentic so that creativity may be seen as an
activity that affirms human dignity rather than a purely market-centric en-
deavor. In her book, The World Republic of Letters, Pascale Casanova de-
scribes a global arena where political power dominates and controls literary
expressions; where writers from dominated and marginalized literary spaces
must struggle to find literary existence that is independent of the literary
strictures imposed by dominating political and economic powers. She
writes:
[I]n those lands where the most ancient resources have permitted
literature to emancipate itself (or nearly so) from all forms of ex-
ternal dependence, a remorseless ethnocentrism causes the formi-
dable hierarchical structure of the literary world—the de facto
inequality of its participants—to be rejected. Political depen-
dence, internal translations, national and linguistic concerns, the
necessity of constituting a patrimony in order to enter into literary
time—all these things that constrain the purpose and the form of
literary works from the margins of the republic of letters are at
once denied and disregarded by those who lay down its laws in
the center.129
Lawmakers sometimes deny and disregard the inequalities that are cre-
ated through legal choices. At times these inequalities are severe, particu-
larly when there are no objective moral standards to serve as a benchmark
for evaluating decisions made and actions taken. In the copyright system,
poor, minority, and indigenous communities bear disproportionate risk of
injustice as the law makes choices in favor of those who hold greater eco-
nomic and political power. Uses and production of creative works that are
essentially market-driven will not support the common good, and the desire
to reap market rewards enabled by the copyright system will not allow indi-
viduals in society to fully flourish. Human dignity is inextricably entwined
with the ability to freely express oneself. A copyright system with natural
law at its core will protect self-expression and ultimately benefit the com-
mon good.
129. PASCALE CASANOVA, THE WORLD REPUBLIC OF LETTERS 353 (M. B. DeBevoise trans.,
2004).
